Abstract. An increasing amount of information today is generated, exchanged, and stored digitally. This also includes long-lived and highly sensitive information (e.g., electronic health records, governmental documents) whose integrity and confidentiality must be protected over decades or even centuries. While there is a vast amount of cryptography-based data protection schemes, only few are designed for long-term protection. Recently, Braun et al. (AsiaCCS'17) proposed the first long-term protection scheme that provides renewable integrity protection and information-theoretic confidentiality protection. However, computation and storage costs of their scheme increase significantly with the number of stored data items. As a result, their scheme appears suitable only for protecting databases with a small number of relatively large data items, but unsuitable for databases that hold a large number of relatively small data items (e.g., medical record databases). In this work, we present a solution for efficient long-term integrity and confidentiality protection of large datasets consisting of relatively small data items. First, we construct a renewable vector commitment scheme that is information-theoretically hiding under selective decommitment. We then combine this scheme with renewable timestamps and informationtheoretically secure secret sharing. The resulting solution requires only a single timestamp for protecting a dataset while the state of the art requires a number of timestamps linear in the number of data items. We implemented our solution and measured its performance in a scenario where 12 000 data items are aggregated, stored, protected, and verified over a time span of 100 years. Our measurements show that our new solution completes this evaluation scenario an order of magnitude faster than the state of the art.
Introduction

Motivation and problem statement
Today, huge amounts of information are generated, exchanged, and stored digitally and these amounts will further grow in the future. Much of this data contains sensitive information (e.g., electronic health records, governmental documents, enterprise documents) and requires protection of integrity and confidentiality. Integrity protection means that illegitimate and accidental changes of data can be discovered. Confidentiality protection means that only authorized parties can access the data. Depending on the use case, protection may be required for several decades or even centuries. Databases that require protection are often complex and consist of a large number of relatively small data items that require continuous confidentiality protection and whose integrity must be verifiable independent from the other data items.
Today, integrity of digitally stored information is most commonly ensured using digital signatures (e.g., RSA [21] ) and confidentiality is ensured using encryption (e.g., AES [19] ). The commonly used schemes are secure under certain computational assumptions. For example, they require that computing the prime factors of a large integer is infeasible. However, as computing technology and cryptanalysis advances over time, computational assumptions made today are likely to break at some point in the future (e.g., RSA will become insecure once quantum computers are available [24] ). Consequently, computationally secure cryptographic schemes have a limited lifetime and are insufficient to provide long-term security.
Several approaches have been developed to mitigate long-term security risks. Bayer et al. [1] proposed a technique for prolonging the validity of a digital signature by using digital timestamps. Based on their idea, a variety of long-term integrity protection schemes have been developed. less memory. In particular, protection renewal is significantly faster with ELSA. Renewing the timestamps for approximately 12 000 data items takes 21.89 min with LINCOS and only 0.34 s with ELSA. Furthermore, storage of the timestamps and commitments consumes 1.75 GB of storage space with LINCOS and only 17.27 MB with ELSA at the end of the experiment. These improvements are achieved at slightly higher storage costs for the shareholders. Each shareholder consumes 559 MB with LINCOS and 748 MB with ELSA. The storage costs for integrity protection are independent of the size of the data items. Storage, retrieval, and verification of a data item takes less than a second. Overall, our evaluation shows that ELSA provides practical performance and is suitable for storing and protecting large and complex databases that consist of relatively small data items over long periods of time (e.g., health record or governmental document databases).
Related work
Our notion of vector commitments is reminiscent of the one proposed by Catalano and Fiore [7] . However, they do not consider the hiding property and therefore do not analyze hiding under selective opening security. Also, they do not consider extractable binding security. Hofheinz [15] studied the notion of selective decommitment and showed that schemes can be constructed that are statistically hiding under selective decommitment. However, they do not consider constructions of vector commitments where a short commitment is given for a set of messages. In [2] , Bitansky et al. propose the construction of a SNARK from extractable collision-resistant hash functions in combination with Merkle trees. While their construction is similar to the extractable-binding vector commitment scheme proposed in Section 3.2, our construction relies on a weaker property (i.e., extractable-binding hash functions) and our security analysis provides concrete security estimates.
Weinert et al. [26] recently proposed a long-term integrity protection scheme that also uses hash trees to reduce the number of timestamps. However, their scheme does not support confidentiality protection, lacks a formal security analysis, and is less efficient than our construction. Only few work has been done with respect to combining long-term integrity with long-term confidentiality protection. The first storage architecture providing these two properties and most efficient to date is LINCOS [3] . Recently, another long-term secure storage architecture has been proposed by Geihs et al. [8] that provides access pattern hiding security in addition to integrity and confidentiality. On a high level, this is achieved by combining LINCOS with an information theoretically secure ORAM. While access pattern hiding security is an interesting property in certain scenarios where meta information about the stored data is known, it is achieved at the cost of additional computation and communication and it is out of the scope of this work.
Preliminaries
Notation
For a probabilistic algorithm A and input x, we write A(x) → r y to denote that A on input x produces y using random coins r. For a vector V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), n ∈ N, and set I ⊆ [n], define V I := (v i ) i∈I , and for i ∈ [n], define V i := v i . For a pair of random variables (A, B), we define the statistical distance of A and B as ∆(A, B) := x |Pr A (x) − Pr B (x)|.
Cryptographic primitives
We describe the cryptographic primitives that will be relevant for the understanding of this paper.
Digital Signature Schemes A digital signature scheme SIG is defined by a tuple (M, Setup, Sign, Verify), where M is the message space, and Setup, Sign, Verify are algorithms with the following properties.
Setup → (sk, pk): This algorithm generates a secret signing key sk and a public verification key pk. Sign(sk, m) → s: This algorithm gets as input a secret key sk and a message m ∈ M. It outputs a signature s.
Verify(pk, m, s) → b: This algorithm gets as input a public key pk, a message m, and a signature s. It outputs b = 1, if the signature is valid, and 0, if it is invalid.
A signature scheme is -secure [11] if for any t-bounded algorithm A,
where O(m) = {Q += m; Sign(sk, m) → s; return s; }.
Timestamp schemes A timestamp scheme involves a client and a timestamp service. The timestamp service initializes itself using algorithm Setup. The client uses protocol Stamp to request a timestamp from the timestamp service. Furthermore, there exists an algorithm Verify that allows anybody to verify the validity of a message-timestamp-tuple. Timestamp schemes can be realized in different ways (e.g., based on hash functions or digital signature schemes [12] ). Here, we only consider timestamp schemes based on digital signatures. This works as follows. On initialization, the timestamp service chooses a signature scheme SIG and runs the setup algorithm SIG.Setup → (sk, pk). It publishes the public key pk. A client obtains a timestamp for a message m, as follows. First, it sends the message to the timestamp service. Then, the timestamp service reads the current time t and creates a signature on m and t by running SIG.Sign(sk, [m, t]) → s. It then sends the signature s and the time t back to the client. Anybody can verify the validity of a timestamp (t, s) for a message m by checking SIG.Verify(pk, [m, t], s) = 1. Such a signature-based timestamp scheme is considered secure as long as the signature scheme is secure.
Commitment schemes A (non-internactive) commitment scheme COM is defined by a tuple (M, Setup, Commit, Verify), where M is the message space, and Setup, Commit, Verify are algorithms with the following properties. A commitment scheme is considered secure if it is hiding and binding. There exist different flavors of defining binding security. Here, we are interested in extractable binding commitments as this enables renewable and long-term secure commitments [6] . A commitment scheme is -extractablebinding-secure if for any t 1 -bounded algorithm A 1 , there exists an t E -bounded algorithm E, such that for any t 2 -bounded algorithm
For any public key k and message m, define C k (m) as the random variable that takes the value of c when sampling
Keyed hash functions A keyed hash function is a tuple of algorithms (K, H) with the following properties. K is a probabilistic algorithm that generates a key k. H is a deterministic algorithm that on input a key k and a message x ∈ {0, 1} * outputs a short fixed length hash y ∈ {0, 1} l , for some l ∈ N. We say a keyed hash function (K, F ) is -extractable-binding if for any t 1 -bounded algorithm A 1 , there exists a t E -bounded algorithm E, such that for any t 2 -bounded algorithm A 2 ,
Secret sharing schemes A secret sharing scheme allows a data owner to share a secret data object among a set of shareholders such that only specified subsets of the shareholders can reconstruct the secret, while all the other subsets of the shareholders have no information about the secret. In this work, we consider threshold secret sharing schemes [22] , for which there exists a threshold parameter t (chosen by the data owner) such that any set of t shareholders can reconstruct the secret, but any set of less than t shareholders has no information about the secret. A secret sharing scheme has a protocol Setup for generating the sharing parameters, a protocol Share for sharing a data object, and a protocol Reconstruct for reconstructing a data object from a given set of shares. In addition to standard secret sharing schemes, proactive secret sharing schemes additionally provide a protocol Reshare for protection against so called mobile adversaries [14] . The protocol Reshare is an interactive protocol between the shareholders after which all the stored shares are refreshed so that they no longer can be combined with the old shares for reconstruction. This protects against adversaries who gradually corrupt an increasing number of shareholders over the course of time.
3 Statistically hiding and extractable binding vector commitments
In this section, we define statistically hiding and extractable binding vector commitments, describe a construction, and prove the construction secure. This construction is the basis for our performance improvements that we achieve with our new storage architecture presented in Section 4. [7] . However, neither do they require their commitments to be extractable binding nor do they consider their hiding property. A vector commitment scheme is correct, if a decommitment produced by Commit and Open will always verify for the corresponding commitment and message.
Definition
Definition 2 (Correctness
A vector commitment scheme is statistically hiding under selective opening, if the distribution of commitments and openings does not depend on the unopened messages.
Definition 3 (Statistically hiding (under selective opening)
A vector commitment scheme is extractable binding, if for every efficient committer, there exists an efficient extractor, such that for any efficient decommitter, if the committer gives a commitment that can be opened by a decommitter, then the extractor can already extract the corresponding messages from the committer at the time of the commitment.
Definition 4 (Extractable binding). Let
We say a vector commitment scheme (L, M, Setup, Commit, Open, Verify) is -extractable-binding, if for all t 1 -bounded algorithms A 1 , t E -bounded algorithms E, and t 2 -bounded algorithms A 2 ,
Construction: extractable binding
In the following, we show that the Merkle hash tree construction [18] can be casted into a vector commitment scheme and that this construction is extractable binding if the used hash function is extractable binding.
The following is a description of the hash tree scheme by Merkle cast into the definition of vector commitments.
Theorem 1. The vector commitment scheme described in Construction 1 is correct.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1). Let (L, M, Setup, Commit, Open, Verify) be the scheme described in 
Proof (Proof of Theorem 2). Let (K, H) be an -extractable-binding keyed hash function and let (L, M, Setup, Commit, Open, Verify) be the vector commitment scheme described in Construction 1 instantiated with (K, H). To prove the theorem, we use the extractable-binding property of (K, H) to construct an extractor for the vector commitment scheme.
Fix t 1 , t E , t 2 ∈ N and t 1 -bounded algorithm A 1 . We observe that, because (K, H) is -extractablebinding, for any t-bounded algorithm A, there exists a t E -bounded algorithm E H A such that for any t 2 -bounded algorithm A 2 , for experiment A(k) → r h, A 2 (k, r) → m, and E H A (k, r) → m , we have H(k, m) = h and m = m with probability at most (t, t E , t 2 ).
Define A 0,0 as an algorithm that on input k, samples r, computes E
, and outputs h 0,0 . Recursively, define A i,j as an algorithm that on input k, samples r, computes E
, and outputs h j mod 2 . Now define the vector extraction algorithm E as follows. On input (k, r), first compute E
We observe that for any t 2 -bounded algorithm A 2 , for experiment
, and E(k, r) → M , the probability of having Verify(k, m, c, d, i) = 1 and M i = m is upperbounded by the probability that at least one of the node extraction algorithms relied on by E fails. As there are at most 2L nodes in the tree, this probability is upper-bounded by 2L * (max{t 1 , t E }, t E , t 2 ).
It follows that Construction 1 is -extractable-binding with (t 1 , t E , t 2 ) = 2L * (t 1 +t E /L, t E /L, t 2 ).
Construction: extractable binding and statistically hiding
We now combine a statistically hiding and extractable binding commitment scheme with the vector commitment scheme from Construction 1 to obtain a statistically hiding (under selective opening) and extractable binding vector commitment scheme. The idea is to first commit with the statistically hiding scheme to each message separately and then produce a vector commitment to these individually generated commitments.
Construction 2 Let COM be a commitment scheme and VC be a vector commitment scheme.
, and output b.
Theorem 3. The vector commitment scheme described in Construction 2 is correct if COM and VC are correct.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3). Let (L, M, Setup, Commit, Open, Verify) be the scheme described in 
n , k ∈ Setup, and event A ⊆ Ω(CD k (M, I)), denote by Pr M (A) the probability that A is observed when sampling from
By the definition of the statistical distance, we have
We observe that for any
. By the law of total probability we have
Furthermore, we observe that c and T are determined by (k,C). We also observe that on input
, and i ∈ [n], algorithm Open computes HT.Path(k 2 , T, i) → P and outputs It follows that
We observe that because Com is -statistically-hiding, we have that
In summary, we obtain
Theorem 5. If COM and VC of Construction 2 are -extractable-binding, Construction 2 is an -extractable-binding vector commitment scheme with
Proof (Proof of Theorem 5). Let t 1 , t E , t 2 ∈ N and fix any t 1 -bounded algorithm A 1 that on input k outputs c. We observe that because VC is -extractable-binding that there exists a t E -bounded extraction algorithm E 0 such that for any t 2 -bounded algorithm
, and E 0 (k, r) → C, we have VC.Verify(k 2 , c i , c, d, i) = 1 and C i = c i with probability at most (t 1 , t E , t 2 ).
Define A i as an algorithm that on input k, samples r, computes E 0 (k, r) → C, and outputs C i . For i > 0, define E i as a t E -bounded extraction algorithm such that for any t 2 -bounded al-
, we have COM.Verify(k 1 , m i , c i , d i ) = 1 and m i = m i with probability at most (t E , t E , t 2 ). Now we define a message vector extraction algorithm E as follows. On input (k, r), first compute
, and E(k, r) → M , we have Verify(k, m, c, d, i) = 1 and M i = m with probability at most L * (t 1 + t E , t E , t 2 ).
It follows that the vector commitment scheme described in Construction 2 is -extractablebinding with (
4
Now we present ELSA, a long-term secure storage architecture that efficiently protects large datasets. It provides long-term integrity and long-term confidentiality protection of the stored data. ELSA uses statistically-hiding and extractable-binding vector commitments (as described in Section 3) in combination with timestamps to achieve renewable and privacy preserving integrity protection. The confidential data is stored using proactive secret sharing to guarantee confidentiality protection secure against computational attacks. The data owner communicates with two subsystems (Figure 1) , where one is responsible for data storage with confidentiality protection and the other one is responsible for integrity protection. The evidence service is responsible for integrity protection updates and the secret share holders are responsible for storing the data and maintaining confidentiality protection. The evidence service also communicates with a timestamp service that is used in the process of evidence generation.
Data owner Shareholders Evidence Service
Timestamp Service
Secret Shares
Commitments, Timestamps Fig. 1 . Overview of the components of ELSA.
Construction
We now describe the storage architecture ELSA in terms of the algorithms Init, Store, RenewTs, RenewCom, RenewShares, and Verify. Algorithm Init initializes the architecture, Store allows to store new files, RenewTs renews the protection if the timestamp scheme security is weakened, RenewCom renews the protection if the commitment scheme security is weakened, RenewShares renews the shares to protect against a mobile adversary who collects multiple shares over time, and Verify verifies the integrity of a retrieved file. We use the following notation. When we write SH.Store(name, dat) we mean that the data owner shares the data dat among the shareholders using protocol SHARE.Share associated with identifier name. If the shared data dat is larger then the size of the message space of the secret sharing scheme, dat is first split into chunks that fit into the message space and then the chunks are shared individually. Each shareholder maintains a database that describes which shares belong to which data item name. When we write SH.Retrieve(name), we mean that the data owner retrieves the shares associated identifier name from the shareholders and reconstructs the data using protocol SHARE.Reconstruct.
Initialization The data owner uses algorithm ELSA.Init (Algorithm 1) to initialize the storage system. The algorithm gets as input a proactive secret sharing scheme SHARE, a set of shareholder addresses (shURL i ) i∈[N ] , a sharing threshold T , and an evidence service address esURL. It then initializes the storage module SH by running protocol SHARE.Setup and the evidence service module ES by setting ES.evidence as an empty table and ES.renewLists as an empty list.
Data storage The client uses algorithm ELSA.Store (Algorithm 2) to store a set of data files [file i ] i∈ [n] , which works as follows. First a signature scheme SIG, a vector commitment scheme VC, and a timestamp scheme TS are chosen. Here, we assume that SIG is supplied with the secret key necessary for signature generation and VC is supplied with the public parameters necessary for commitment generation. The algorithm first signs each of the data objects individually. The algorithm then stores the file data, the public key certificate of the signature scheme instance, and the generated signature at the secret sharing storage system. Afterwards, the algorithm generates a vector commitment (c, D) to the file data vector and the signatures. For each file, the corresponding decommitment is extracted and stored at the shareholders. The file names filenames, the commitment scheme instance VC, the commitment c, and the chosen timestamp scheme instance TS are sent to the evidence service. We remark that signing each data object individually potentially allows for having a different signer for each data object. If the data objects are to be signed by the same user, an alternative is to sign the commitment instead of the data objects.
When the evidence service receives (filenames, VC, c, TS), it does the following in algorithm AddCom (Algorithm 3). It first timestamps the commitment (VC, c) and thereby obtains a timestamp ts. Then, it starts a new evidence list l = [(VC, c, TS, ts)] and assigns this list with all the file names in filenames. Also, it adds l to the list renewLists, which contains the lists that are updated on a timestamp renewal. Timestamp renewal Algorithm ES.RenewTs (Algorithm 4) is performed by the evidence service regularly in order to protect against the weakening of the currently used timestamp scheme. The algorithm gets as input a vector commitment scheme instance VC and a timestamp scheme instance TS. It first creates a vector commitment (c , D ) for the list of renewal items renewLists. Here, we only require the extractable-binding property of VC , while the hiding property is not required as all of the data stored at the evidence service is independent of the secret data due to the use of unconditionally hiding commitments by the data owner. For each updated list item i, the freshly generated timestamp, commitment, and extracted decommitment are added to the corresponding evidence list renewLists[i]. Commitment renewal The data owner runs algorithm ELSA.RenewCom (Algorithm 5) to protect against a weakening of the currently used commitment scheme. It chooses a new commitment scheme instance VC and a new timestamp scheme instance TS and proceeds as follows. First the table of evidence lists ES.evidence are retrieved from the evidence service and complemented with the decommitment values stored at the shareholders. Next, a list with the data items, the signatures, and the current evidence for each data item is constructed. This list is then committed using the vector commitment scheme VC. The decommitments are extracted and stored at the shareholders, and the commitment is added to the evidence at the evidence service using algorithm ES.AddComRenew. Secret share renewal There are two types of share renewal supported by ELSA. The first type (Algorithm 7) triggers the share renewal protocol of the secret sharing system (i.e., the protocol SHARE.Reshare). This interactive protocol refreshes the shares at the shareholders so that old shares, which may have leaked already, cannot be combined with the new shares, which are obtained after the protocol has finished, to reconstruct the stored data. The second type (Algorithm 8) replaces the proactive sharing scheme entirely. This may be necessary if the scheme has additional security properties like verifiability (see proactive verifiable secret sharing [14] ), whose security may be weakened. In this case, the data is retrieved, shared to the new shareholders, and finally the old shareholders are shutdown. Data retrieval The algorithm ELSA.Retrieve (Algorithm 9) describes the data retrieval procedure of ELSA. It gets as input the name of the data file that is to be retrieved. It then collects the evidence from the evidence service and the data from the shareholders. Next, the evidence is complemented with the decommitments and then the algorithm outputs the data with the corresponding evidence. Verification Algorithm ELSA.Verify (Algorithm 10) describes how a verifier can check the integrity of a data item using the evidence produced by ELSA. Here we denote by NTT(i, e, t verify ) the time of the next timestamp after entry i of e and by NCT(i, e, t verify ) the time of the timestamp corresponding to the next commitment after entry i, and we set NTT(i, e, t verify ) = t verify if i is the last timestamp and NCT(i, e, t verify ) = t verify if i is the last commitment in e. The algorithm gets as input a reference to the considered PKI (e.g., a trust anchor), the current verification time t verify , the data to be checked dat, the storage time t store , and the corresponding evidence E = (SIG, s, e). The algorithm returns true, if dat is authentic and has been stored at time t store . In more detail, the verification algorithm works as follows. It first checks whether the signature s is valid for the data object dat under signature scheme instance SIG at the time of the first timestamp of the evidence list e. It also checks whether the corresponding commitment is valid for (dat, SIG, s) at the time of the next commitment and the timestamp is valid at the next timestamp. Then, for each of the remaining |e| − 1 entries of e, the algorithm checks whether the corresponding timestamp is valid at the time of the next timestamp and whether the corresponding commitments are valid at the time of the next commitments. The algorithm outputs 1 if all checks return valid, and it outputs 0 in any other case.
Algorithm 10: ELSA.Verify(PKI, t verify : dat, t store , E) → b (SIG, s, e) ← E; ((VC, c, d), (VC , c , d ), (TS, ts)) ← e1; tnt ← NTT(1, e, t verify ); tnc ← NCT (1, e, t verify ) ; b ← SIG.Verify(PKI, ts.t : dat, s); b ∧= VC.Verify(PKI, tnc : (dat, SIG, s), c, d) ; b ∧= TS.Verify(PKI, tnt : c, ts, tstore); L ← (VC, c, TS, ts);
Security analysis
Computational model In a long-running system we have to consider adversaries that increase their computational power over time. For example, they may increase their computation speed or acquire new computational devices, such as quantum computers. We capture this by using the computational model from [6] . A real-time bounded long-lived adversary A is defined as a sequence (A (0) , A (1) , A (2) , . . .) of machines with A (t) ∈ M t and is associated with a global clock Clock. We assume that the class M t of computing machines available at time t widens when t increases, i.e., M t ⊆ M t for t < t . The adversary is given the power to advance the clock, but it cannot go backwards in time. When A Clock is started, then actually the component A (0) is run. Whenever a component A (t) calls the clock oracle to set a new time t , then component A (t) is stopped and the component A (t ) is run with input the internal state of A (t) . Real-time computational bounds are expressed as follows. Let A Clock be a computing machine associated with Clock, and let ρ : N → N be a function. We say A is ρ-bounded if for every time t, the aggregated step count of the machine components of A until time t is at most ρ(t).
Integrity First, we analyze integrity protection, by which we mean that it should be infeasible for an adversary to forge a valid evidence list for a data object, but the data object has not been authentically signed at the claimed time. This is captured in the following definition, where we define security with respect to a set of schemes S (e.g., commitment schemes, signature schemes, timestamp schemes) that are available within the context of the adversary. Also, we assume that each scheme instance S i is associated with a breakage time t b i after which it is considered insecure. The experiment (Algorithm 11) has a setup phase, where all the scheme instances are initialized by means of parameter generation. We write S i .Setup() → (sk, pk) to denote that a scheme potentially generates a secret parameter sk (e.g., a private signing key) and a public parameter pk (e.g., a public verification key or the parameters of a commitment scheme instance). We allow the adversary to access the secret parameters of an instance once it is considered insecure (via oracle Break).
Definition 5 (Integrity)
The experiment Exp Forge is described in Algorithm 11. Next, we prove that the security of ELSA can be reduced to the extractable binding security of the used commitment schemes and the unforgeability of the used signature schemes within their validity period.
Theorem 6. Let M = (M t ) t specify which computational technology is available at which point in time and let S be a set of cryptographic schemes, where each scheme S i ∈ S is associated with a breakage time t b i and is i -secure against adversaries using computational technology M t b i . In particular, we require unforgeability-security for signature schemes and extractable-binding-security for commitment schemes. Let p E be any computational bound and L be an upper bound on the maximum vector length of the commitment schemes in S. Then, ELSA is (M, )-unforgeable for S with (p) = ( i∈SIG i (p(t
. Proof (Proof of Theorem 6). Suppose any p-bounded machine A that interacts with interfaces Clock, PKI, SIG, and TS, and outputs (dat, t store , E). For each signature scheme i ∈ SIG, construct a machine B i with the goal to break the unforgeability of scheme i until time t b i . B i in the signature unforgeability experiment gets as input a public key pk and access to a signing oracle Sign. Its goal is to output (m, s) such that S i .Verify(pk, m, s) = 1 and the oracle Sign was not queried with m. B i , on input pk, does the following. It runs A until time t b i and simulates the environment of A with the following difference. B i sets the public key of signature scheme i to pk and whenever the simulation of the experiment for A requires the generation of a signature for scheme i, B i requests the signature from the oracle Sign. While A is running, B i searches the outputs of A for a valid message-signature-pair, where the message has not been queried to the signing oracle thus far. B i also uses the extractable-binding property of the commitment schemes, as follows. Whenever, A queries the timestamp service TS with a commitment, then B i uses a p E -bounded commitment message extractor to extract the corresponding messages out of A. Let L be an upper bound on the maximum length supported by all the used vector commitment schemes COM. Then,
2 operations and adheres to the computational model M t b i . We observe that an evidence object E is a sequence (SIG, s, CDT 1 , . . . , CDT n ), where
The verification algorithm of ELSA ensures that ts i is a valid timestamp for (VC j , c j , CT j , . . . , CT i−1 ), where j is the largest index such that VC j = ⊥ and j ≤ i. If VC j = ⊥, then it also ensures that d i is a valid opening of c i to (dat, SIG, s, CDT 1 , . . . , CDT i−1 ). It follows that in every run in which A outputs (dat, t store , E) with Verify(PKI, t verify ; dat, t store , E) = 1 and dat ∈ Q tstore , there is at least one B i that wins its unforgeability experiment before time t b i or at least one of the extractors used by B i fails. Hence, the probability that A breaks ELSA is upper bounded by ( i∈SIG i (p Bi ))+( i∈COM i (p(t Confidentiality Next, we analyze confidentiality protection of ELSA. Intuitively, we require that an adversary with unbounded computational power who observes the data that is received by the evidence service and a subset of the shareholders does not learn any substantial information about the stored data. In particular, it should be guaranteed that an adversary does not learn anything about unopened files even if it retrieves some of the other files and the corresponding signatures, commitments, and timestamps.
We model this intuition by requiring that any (unbounded) adversary A should not be able to distinguish whether it interacts with a system that stores a file vector F 1 or a system that stores another file vector F 2 , if A only opens a subset I of files and F 1 and F 2 are identical on I. This is modeled in experiment Exp DIST (Algorithm 12), where we use the following notation. For a secret sharing scheme SHARE we denote by SHARE.AS the set of authorized shareholder subsets that can reconstruct the secret. For a protocol P, we write P View to denote an execution of P where View contains all the data sent and received by the involved parties. For an involved party P, we write View(P) to denote the data sent and received by party P.
Definition 6 (Confidentiality). We say ELSA is -statistically-hiding for S, if for all machines A, subsets I, sets of files
The experiment Exp DIST is described in Algorithm 12. Next, we show that ELSA indeed provides confidentiality protection as defined above if statistically hiding secret sharing and commitment schemes are used.
Algorithm 12: Exp
Theorem 7. Let S be a set of schemes, where S.SHARE is an -statistically-hiding secret sharing scheme and every commitment scheme in S is -statistically-hiding. Then, ELSA is -statisticallyhiding for S with (L) = 2L .
Proof (Proof of Theorem 7). We observe that the statistical distance between the view of the evidence service and the receiver for F 1 and the view for F 2 is at most per call to ELSA because the vector commitment schemes in S are -statistically-hiding. The statistical distance between the view of an unauthorized subset of shareholders for F 1 and the view of the same subset of shareholders for F 2 is also at most because the secret sharing scheme is -statistically-hiding. It follows that the statistical distance for each query of the adversary diverges by at most 2 . Hence, overall the statistical distance is bounded by 2L .
With regards to protecting the network communication between the data owner and the shareholders we ideally require that information theoretically channels are used (e.g., based on Quantum Key Distribution and One-Time-Pad Encryption [10] ), so that a network provider, who could potentially intercept all of the secret share packages, cannot learn any information about the communicated data. If information theoretically secure channels are not available, we recommend to use very strong symmetric encryption (e.g., AES-256 [19] ).
Performance evaluation
We compare the performance of our new architecture ELSA with the performance of the storage architecture LINCOS [3] , which is the fastest existing storage architecture that provides long-term integrity and long-term confidentiality.
Evaluation scenario
For our evaluation we consider a scenario inspired by the task of securely storing electronic health records in a medium sized doctor's office. The storage time frame is 100 years. Every month, 10 new data items of size 10 kB (e.g., prescription data of patients) are added. Every year, one document from each of the previous years is retrieved and verified (e.g., historic prescription data is read from the archives).
We assume the following renewal schedule for protecting the evidence against the weakening of cryptographic primitives. The signatures are renewed every 2 years, as this is a typical lifetime of a public key certificate, which is needed to verify the signatures. While signature scheme instances can only be secure as long as the corresponding private signing key is not leaked to an adversary, commitment scheme instances do not involve the usage of any secret parameters. Therefore, their security is not threatened by key leakage and we assume that they only need to be renewed every 10 years in order to adjust the cryptographic parameter sizes or to choose a new and more secure scheme.
In our architecture we instantiate signature and commitment schemes as follows. As signature scheme, we first use the RSA Signature Scheme [21] and then switch to the post-quantum secure XMSS signature scheme [5] by 2030, as we anticipate the development of large-scale quantum computers. Both of these schemes satisfy unforgeability security as required by Theorem 6. As the vector commitment scheme we use Construction 2 with the statistically hiding commitment scheme by Halevi and Micali [13] whose security is based on the security of the used hash function which we instantiate with members of the SHA-2 hash function family [20] . If we model hash functions as random oracles, the extractable-binding property required by Theorem 6 is provided. This vector commitment scheme construction also provides statistical hiding security as required by Theorem 7. We adjust the signature and commitment scheme parameters over time as proposed by Lenstra and Verheul [17, 16] . The resulting parameter sets are shown in Table 1 . For the storage system, we use the secret sharing scheme by Shamir [22] . We run this scheme with 4 shareholders and a threshold of 3 shareholders are required for reconstruction. Secret shares are renewed every 5 years, where the resharing is carried out centrally by the data owner.
Results
We now present the results of our performance analysis. Figure 2 compares the computation time and storage costs of the two systems, ELSA and LINCOS. Our implementation was done using the programming language Java. The experiments were performed on a computer with a quad-core AMD Opteron CPU running at 2.3 GHz and the Java virtual machine was assigned 32 GB of RAM.
We observe that ELSA is much more computationally efficient compared to LINCOS. Completing the experiment using LINCOS took approximately 6.81 h, while it took only 24 min using ELSA. The biggest difference in the timings is observed when renewing timestamps. Timestamp renewal with LINCOS for year 2116 takes 21.89 min, while it takes only 0.34 s with ELSA. Data storage performance is also considerably faster with ELSA than with LINCOS. The same holds for the commitment renewal procedure. Data retrieval and verification performance is similar for the two systems.
Next, we observe that ELSA is also more efficient compared to LINCOS when it comes to the consumed storage space at the evidence service. This is, again, because ELSA requires fewer timestamps to be generated and stored than LINCOS. After running for 100 years, the evidence service of ELSA consumes only 17.27 MB while the evidence service of LINCOS consumes 1.75 GB of storage space. We observe by Figure 2 that ELSA consumes slightly more storage space at the shareholders than LINCOS. This is because additional decommitment information for the vector commitments must be stored. After running for 100 years, a shareholder of ELSA consumes about 748 MB while a shareholder of LINCOS consumes about 559 MB of storage space. 
